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Debt-for-Nature Swaps in Brazil:
Response to World
Pressure to Protect the Amazon
DAVID ALLEN REIsMAN*
INTRODUCTION
The controversy over the Amazon results from contrasting
views in which the region is perceived. One view sees it as a
dark and threatening jungle, rich in natural resources, but gen-
erally impenetrable, barring progress and leaving millions of
acres of land wasted. Another view perceives the region as a
crucial keystone to the environment whose absence would lead
to global catastrophe. The former envisions a "clearing" of the
Amazon to allow progress to move in and create economic
opportunity by making use of the vast natural resources the
region has to offer. The latter prefers to preserve, to the greatest
extent feasible, the delicate ecological balance of the Amazonian
environment.
When these views are placed within the context of complex
international economic and environmental policies, the answers
to important environmental concerns become more undefined.
The problem is further complicated by Brazil's underdevelop-
ment and its desire to hold onto its sovereignty. As is often the
case in such dilemmas, the problem is not easily solved through
a moral analysis of right and wrong. In such cases, sides must
often try to find a way to come together through economic
incentives. Brazil is no exception.
This paper will analyze Brazil's environmental history and
its response to the international environmental pressures that led
the nation to consider and complete its first debt-for-nature
swap. The following topics will be addressed: I. Brazil and Its
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Natural Resources; II. Deforestation; III. Brazil as a Debtor
Nation; IV. Emergence of Debt-for-Equity Swaps; V. Debt-For-
Nature Swaps; VI. How Debt-for-Nature Swaps Work; VII.
Brazil's Initiative Toward International Recognition; VIII. Brazil
Looks Toward the Future; and IX. The Role of Environmental
Law.
I. BRAZIL AND ITS NATURAL RESOURCES
Brazil is the sixth largest country in the world covering a
total area of 3,286,488 square miles with a population of over
153 million.' The country is about the same size as the conti-
nental United States or China. Brazil also hosts approximately
three-fifths of the entire Amazon Basin, the largest tropical moist
forest area in the world.2 The Amazon forest covers 42% of the
national territory.' The many minerals that currently exist in the
region include manganese, bauxite, tin, gold, diamonds, copper,
lead, and the world's largest deposit of iron ore.4 Thus, the
Amazon basin constitutes one of the world's largest and richest
areas of natural resources.
II. DEFORESTATION
Brazil is not the sole actor among the nations promoting a
policy of decimating the Amazon for its wealth. The United
States and Great Britain, for example, are among the largest
foreign purchasers of Brazilian wood. Japan is the world's larg-
est consumer of tropical goods and maintains a heavy reliance
on tropical hardwoods.' Japan is also the biggest importer of
Carajas6 iron followed by Germany. 7 Both nations have become
dependent on this source of ore for their steel production.' Brazil
and the many other world nations interested in reaping the
I KCDW/Kaleidescope, Feb. 24, 1992, available in LEXIS, Int'l File.
2 Marc Pallemaerts, Development, Conservation, and Indigenous Rights in Brazil,
8 Hum. RTS. Q. 374 (1986).
3 Id.
4 James Bruinsma, Brazil Enacts New Protections for the Amazon Rain Forest,
30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 503, 506 n.28 (1989).
1 Micheal Molinski, Deforestation Slows in Amazon, Proprietary to the UPI,
Mar. 7, 1991 (International) available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
6 Carajas is a city in Brazil.
7 Ecology and Investment, INT'L REP. (IBC USA, Brazil) (Mar. 7 1990) (Spotlight




benefits of the Amazon offer a seemingly inexhaustible supply
of dollars that have been and could be used to exploit the
Amazon region.
About 7007o, or approximately 360 million hectares [one hec-
tare equals one square kilometer], of the Amazon lies within
Brazil. The rest is divided between Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Col-
ombia, Venezuela, Guyana, and Surinam.9 Forty percent of
Brazil's territory, or about 3.5 million square kilometers, is an
area known as the "classic Amazon."' 1 The Amazon is vast,
sparse in population, but rich in minerals, timber, energy, and
other natural resources." It is ripe for exploration. Unfortu-
nately, exploitation of the Amazon has led to deforestation
which has created world wide concern in recent years. Mining,
hydroelectric power, farming/cattle ranching, oil, lumbering/
logging, and colonization have all contributed to this destruc-
tion. 
2
The rate of deforestation of Brazil's rainforests is still the
world's highest, 3 due mostly to the immense size of the Amazon
jungle.' 4 If current trends continue, some experts predict the
Brazilian rain forest will have vanished by the end of this century
or early into the next. 5
Billions of dollars have been spent to develop the Amazon.
The building of roads, hydroelectric dams, and other projects
has encouraged several million small-scale farmers, cattle ranch-
ers, miners and others to move into the region.' 6 The vast river
systems have become polluted from industries and miners dump-
ing mercury and other chemicals used to separate the gold into
the waters. 7 The release of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere
George de Lama, Brazil Resists Campaign to Save Rain Forests, Cm. TRm.,
Mar. 12 1989, at C1.
,0 Micheal S. Giaimo, Deforestation in Brazil: Domestic Political Imperative -
Global Ecological Disaster, 18 ENvTL. L. 537, 538 (1988).
Id.
" Environmental Issues Pose New Challenges to Companies in Brazil, Bus. INT'L
REP. (Latin America) (June 26, 1989), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, International
File.
,, Molinski, supra note 5.
14 Id.
' About 8.4% of the original size of the Amazon has been deforested solely from
human intervention. This is approximately the size of Arizona, id.
6 Gary Marx, Rain Forest Destruction in Brazil Slows, But Critics Remain Wary,
Cm. TRm., Nov. 30 1990, at C 29.
1 Id.
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has further contributed to the greenhouse effect." In addition,
dozens of indigenous Indian tribes have been decimated by dis-
ease and confrontation with colonists. 19
Lumbering is a major contributor to the deforestation of the
rainforests, although much of the timber cut in the forests is
wasted. Large amounts of trees are cut in highway construction,
large-scale agriculture, and colonization schemes. Most often this
timber is burned or left to rot in the jungle because neither the
government nor the ranchers are willing to invest the time or
money to transport the timber from remote areas.20 The smaller
enterprises usually cut timber from floodplain areas so they can
float logs out during the flood season, contributing only a small
percentage to Brazil's deforestation. Regeneration is rapid in the
rich soil of the flood plains, so this type of logging is compatible
with rainforest survival.2' However, large-scale lumbering still
occurs where corporate timber cutters use large machinery to
clean the highlands where there is poor soil and slow regenera-
tion. 22
The largest impact on deforestation is large-scale ranching.
This activity accounted for 38% of the region's forest loss from
1980 to 1988.2 The intended result of clearing millions of acres
of jungle for use as ranching operations was to increase food
production for export,24 primarily to produce cheap beef for
North American markets. Scientists estimate that efforts to cre-
ate grazing land for ranching by cutting and burning down the
rain forests has resulted in about 30,000 square kilometers (about
12,000 square miles) being lost every year.15 Ironically, a forest
left undisturbed produces approximately ten times as much food
in the form of tropical fruit, game and fish.26
Derek Asiedu-Akrofi, Debt-for-Nature Swaps: Extending the Frontiers of In-
novative Financing in Support of the Global Environment, 25 INT'L LAW. 557, 561
(1991).
11 Stephen Powell, Brazil Could Win Back Prestige with New Rain Forest Policy,
RumrEas, March 4, 1990.
m Giaimo, supra note 10, at 550.
2 Id. at 551.
I Id.
" Id. at 549.
, Some studies suggest that intensive foreign investment in livestock projects has
helped Brazil's foreign exchange rate, id.
Mathew Pearce, Brazil Calls For Help to Protect Amazon Rain Forest, THE
REum s Lin. REP. (June 2, 1989).
" Id. at 549.
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Another great contributor to the destruction of the Amazon
is the construction of highways and rail transportation. One
example is the Brazilian government's current consideration of
the construction of a 500-mile road across the Amazon rain
forest to link the Peruvian Andes to the Pacific Coast. 27 This
project is to be funded by the Japanese government at a cost of
$300 million.2 8 Intended to create a shorter supply route for
Japan, the construction will decimate hundreds of miles of for-
ests and open the Amazon to further settlements, small farms,
large-scale ranches, and mining operations.29 The creation of
more roads alone contributed to 26% of the deforestation of
the Amazon by 1980.30
Yet another significant contributor to Amazon deforestation
is the development of the energy industry. Of particular concern
is the construction of huge hydroelectric dams along the massive
river system. Building large dams, such as the mega projects at
Itaipu and Tucurui, destroys large swaths of forest and displaces
Indian Tribes because of the flooding of vast acreage of the
tropical rain forest. 3 For example, the plant at Tucurui, al-
though proving highly successful, results in a reservoir which
covers more than 1,000 square kilometers, causing significant
ecological disruption despite developers' efforts to minimize the
damage .32
Initially, these dams were preferred over other types of power
due to the non-polluting nature of hydroelectric power.33 Re-
cently, however, concern has been expressed that such hydro-
electric projects could destroy vast tracts of rainforest.34 Thus,
the present trend in Brazil is toward use of nuclear and gas
power.5
Asiedu-Akrofi, supra note 18, at 579.
"Id.
Molinski, supra note 5, at 546.
" Giaimo, supra note 10, at 546.
The Ecology War, INT'L REP. (Jan. 12, 1989), § III, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, International File.
31 Id.
" Ecology and Investment, supra note 7.
'" Id.
? The Ecology War, supra note 31. The last major hydroelectric project proposed,
the Xingu River Plant, was put on hold in 1989 primarily because of these environmental
concerns which dried up bank support for project funding.
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III. BRALn AS A DEBTOR NATION
Despite currently existing resources, the Brazilian economy
is one of the world's weakest. These resources enabled the na-
tion's economy to flourish between 1964 and 1978.36 The country
was once called the most dynamically developing nation in the
world.3 7 However, Brazil's dependence on the importation of the
oil it consumes helped give it the largest foreign debt in the
world.
When the oil shock struck in late 1973, Brazil was the largest
oil importer among the developing countries." To maintain and
permit domestic expansion, external borrowing was an attractive
alternative. Because Brazil had expanded its gross national prod-
uct in 1973 by almost 13.6%'o, had started some large investment
projects, and had strained its current capacity to its maximum,
a sudden stop in spending would have created havoc and slowed
the process of political liberalization. 9
The decision to "borrow through the crisis" proved success-
ful to simultaneously meet two crises head-on during the epi-
demic of the oil shock as well as the endemic crisis of
underdevelopment.4 However, after 1979, conditions worsened
when an increasing portion of foreign borrowing had to be used
to pay for growing oil and interest bills, a fact aggravated by
the world recession.
4'
In 1979, the second oil shock occurred. The price of oil
climbed again, but markets for Brazil's exports diminished with
the onset of world wide recession. 42 During the early 1980's, the
situation became critical due to skyrocketing interest rates, de-
terioration of world markets and commodity prices, and a pro-
longed recession.4 3 By the end of 1982, Brazil's outstanding
16 Daniel P. Caswell, The Promised Land: Analysis of Environmental Factors of
United States Investment in and Development of the Amazon Region in Brazil, 4 N.W.
J. INT'L LAW & Bus. 517, 518-19 (1982).
17 Id. at 518.
See generally, Walter Douglas Stuber, The Brazilian Debt-Equity-Swap Program,
12 HASTINOS INT'L & Copn. L. REv. 613 (1989).
11 DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEBT AND EcoNoMIc PERFORMANCE, COUNTRY STUDIES,
274 (Jeffrey D. Sachs, ed. 1990).
, Marcilio Marques Moreira, THE BRAZmlIAN QUANDRY 15 (1986).
41 Id.
12 Id. at 22.
11 Id. at 27.
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foreign debt totaled $85.3 billion." The debt proved increasingly
more difficult to manage, and from 1982 to 1987 foreign cred-
itors restricted new lending.
4 5
During this time period, the Brazilian government, facing a
growing population and escalating inflation, began developing
more and more of the Amazon basin to utilize its vast natural
resources. In this massive development effort, the seemingly
impenetrable Amazon forest began to give way to the increasing
pressure of fortune hunters, road builders, farmers and loggers.
Millions of people, seeking to exploit the resources of the region,
found their way up the massive river complexes to settle in the
hearts of the basin, and road builders plundered tracts of forests
in their effort to pave the way for even more settlers.
IV. EMERGENCE OF DEBT-FOR-EQUITY SWAPS
With soaring foreign debt problems in the 1980's and the
resulting restrictions on new lending, smaller creditors and local
corporations in Brazil, interested in a cheaper source of funding
and an expansion of existing facilities, began trading debt in-
struments on the secondary market at less than par value. 46 This
resulted in blocking the inflow of new resources to Brazil as
governments and creditors were able to use this more advanta-
geous and cheaper alternative to invest.4 7 In 1984, Brazil discon-
tinued registration for these conversions on the secondary market
in an attempt to prohibit the transfer, assignment and sale of
credits.4
In 1987, "Bacen '"49 revoked the original creditor requirement
and eventually simplified the conversion process by separating
the Debt-Equity-Swap Program from the project for the securi-
tization of Brazil's foreign debt. 0
The Debt-Equity-Swap Program was intended to help restore
flexibility to the country's debt situation and bring debtors and
creditors back together in the competitive marketplace. Like
other debt-exchange concepts, this program allowed a debtor
country, unable or unwilling to pay its foreign debts on time,
to offer its creditor something of value in exchange for volun-
Id. at 31.




, "Bacen" is the Central Bank of Brazil.
,o Stuber, supra note 38, at 616.
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tarily canceling those foreign currency debts." The program
became possible when a growing number of lender banks began
to conclude that sizable portions of their debt portfolios, espe-
cially in Latin America, were uncollectible. These banks began
to write down or sell high-risk debts at substantial discounts,
fueling increased activity in the secondary debt market. The
incentive for creditors often lay in the fact a small but growing
marketplace valued foreign currency debt of less developed coun-
tries at substantially below its full principal amountA2 Debt-for-
nature swaps soon developed from the concept of debt-for-equity
exchanges.
V. DEBT-FOR-NATURE SWAPS
Although debt-for-nature swaps developed from these early
debt/equity programs, they differ in that most of the specific
debt-for-nature transactions have been made by international
conservation organizations, not multi-national corporations. 3
Further, they represent one of the few types of Latin American
debt transactions in which all participants can claim benefits.
54
Where there is a debt for nature swap, "[tihe conservation
groups are able to establish or finance conservation projects at
a favorable cost, the debtor countries can reduce their external
debt service burdens while supporting public interest programs
[and] commercial banks willing to assist such transactions, either
by providing free financial advice or by donating debt, can
obtain favorable publicity and in some cases tax benefits.
' ' 5
However, like debt/equity swaps, "debt-for-nature ex-
changes are sophisticated business deals that require a careful
evaluation of the financial, as well as conservation, aspects of
the transaction." 56 Structured properly, debt-for-nature swaps
can significantly reduce the cost of promoting conservation.
The concept of debt-for-nature swaps was "invented" in
1984 by an ecologist, Thomas Lovejoy, as a way of linking
foreign debt relief to the financing of environmental projects in
Micheal Chamberlain et al., Sovereign Debt Exchanges, 2 U. ILL. L. Rav. 415,
417 (1988).
" Id. at 417-18.
I' d. at 440.





debtor nations. 7 The World Wildlife Fund then pioneered the
concept of using a less developed country's debt for financing
conservation activities.58 Generally, a country agrees not to de-
velop certain tracts of land for a reduction of a specified amount
of debt.5 9 The concept has been relatively successful, thus far,
because those countries heavily indebted tend to be those coun-
tries with the most diverse ecological endowments 0
These ecological endowments exist along with an often deli-
cate and complex ecosystem. The huge debts amassed by these
countries result in an effort to increase export-oriented pro-
grams .61 Establishing such programs increases the capacity to
pay for imports as well as debt service. These efforts then lead
to environmental degradation from exploitation of resources and
further complicates the delicate ecological balance of the re-
gion. 62
Thus, debt-for-nature swaps allow these less developed for-
eign countries to reduce this foreign debt by setting aside and/
or maintaining certain acreage. The swaps also promote domestic
awareness of protection from further degradation 3 and provide
debtor countries with an opportunity to redefine their environ-
mental and development policies."
VI. How DEBT-FOR-NATURE SwAPS WoRK
Debt-for-nature swaps typically involve "a purchase of com-
mercial bank debt by a foreign non-profit organization or a
foreign government agency acting in conjunction with a local
private conservation or environmental organization. '65 Funds
are raised to purchase the debt through conservation organiza-
" Peter Passell, Washington Offers Mountain of Debt to Save Forests, N. Y.
TEms, Jan. 22, 1991, at Cl.
" Asiedu-Akrofi, supra note 18, at 564.
" Bruinsma, supra note 4, at 511.
" Asiedu-Akrofi, supra note 18, at 577. Countries rich in resources are primarily
developing countries that have not yet developed those resources and have a dependence





" Id. at 578.
65 Roseanne Model, Debt-For-Nature Swaps: Environmental Investments Using
Taxpayer Funds Without Adequate Remedies for Appropriation, 45 U. MAM L. Rav.
1195, 1201 (1991).
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tions, foundations and country donors. Basically, the transaction
consists of a five step process:
The investing non-governmental organization (NGO) must seek
approval from the debtor country,
The NGO must acquire the debt instrument,
It must then transfer title to the debt,
The debt must be converted into a local currency instrument,
The NGO's must implement environmental investment pro-
grams."
The process a non-governmental organization and a debtor
country undergo to negotiate debt-for-nature swaps can be time-
consuming and complicated. One of the primary reasons is that
the government of the debtor country is leery of entering into a
debt conversion agreement due to the potential impact on the
country's fiscal budget.6 7 These negotiations create conflict be-
tween the government's monetary representative and the natural
resource representative. Each has a different agenda. The mon-
etary representative wants to negotiate as low a price as possible
for the debt. The natural resource representative wants the cen-
tral bank to pay more to the non-governmental organization for
the debt rate to increase funding for natural resource programs."
The negotiation process for debt-for-nature swaps can be
critical to their success. Before consummating a swap, the non-
governmental organizations and the government should consider
their respective incentives. Generally, two things to be considered
are: 1) whether the debt must be available in the secondary
market at a low enough price, and 2) whether the government
will convert the debt at a high enough price to make the trans-
action feasible.69 A low-discount rate alone may not be sufficient
to assure the swap is financially feasible. Therefore, the debt
conversion should take place at the free-market rate, otherwise,
the exchange rate considerations can outweigh the discount avail-
able at the time of the conversion into local currency.7 0 In
addition, the parties to the transaction must also be assured that
6Brazilian Groups Plan Programme of Debt-for-Nature Swaps, THE FiN. Tnis
LTD., Aug. 23, 1990.
67 J. Eugene Gibson and Randall K. Curtis, A Debt-for-Nature Blueprint, 28
CoLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 331, 350 (1990).
Id. at 348-49.
0 Id. at 350.
71 Id. at 347.
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"the converted funds support conservation and sustainable de-
velopment; listing general categories of eligible conservation pro-
grams and projects (twenty five percent land acquisition, twenty
five percent research and education, twenty five percent refor-
estation, and twenty five percent habitat protection)." ' 7
Debt-for-nature swaps are extremely complex. Therefore,
countries familiar with financial transactions of this nature are
better candidates for a successful swap. There are other signs
that may indicate whether a country would make a good prospect
for such a financial transaction. The non-governmental organi-
zation should weigh carefully the strengths and weaknesses of
the various factors to make its decision on a case-by-case basis.
Not every country that possesses a rain forest or other en-
vironmental treasure is a good candidate for a debt-for-nature
swap. The best prospects are those countries that have environ-
mental programs in which the government is interested but can-
not afford to fund on its own.7 2 The candidates can then be
narrowed to those debtor countries that have "a low debt rating,
so creditor banks are willing to discount the debt, and with debt
that is not easily convertible, so the creditor bank does not have
as many opportunities to sell the debt on the secondary market
to other for-profit institutions.
'7 3
The international secondary debt market is an important
factor in the swap transaction. Originally, the secondary debt
market developed so banks could swap loans among themselves,
thereby avoiding overexposure to any single troubled economy.
74
However, the secondary debt market proved useful in debt-for-
nature swaps, allowing debtor countries to capture discounts on
debts sold on the secondary market and convert such debts into
conservation-related investment.7"
Since the first debt-for-nature swap in 1987, approximately
$100 million has been converted of the $1.2 trillion in debt owed
by developing countries. 76 Although this represents only a min-
uscule portion of world debt, the amounts are expected to in-
', Id.
72 Model, supra note 65, at 1201.
I7 d. at 1198-99.
11 Id. at 1198-99 n.31.
7 Id. at 1199.
76 Debt-for-Nature Strategy Said to Remain Underused by Countries, Banks, her'L
ENvTL. DAmY (BNA) (May 31, 1991).
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crease as solutions to many of the problems associated with the
debt are answered.
77
One problem associated with debt-for-nature swaps is infla-
tion. Generally, inflation results following debt-for-nature swaps
when the debtor government, lacking cash reserves, prints more
money to service the debt conversion. Local currency then falls
as a result of the greater money supply and inflates the prices
for goods. Attempts to control the inflation include limiting the
dollar amount available for swap, issuing local currency bonds
to avoid one large payment in the beginning, or including a non-
financial component in the debt-for-nature swap such as an
agreement to undertake environmental action or reforms in lieu
of making local currency payments.
7
Another problem that may occur is enforcement. A country
may not be willing to agree to strict enforcement provisions that
put the country in the position of being at risk of not being able
to uphold the agreement or being forced to breach the agreement
due to circumstances beyond its control. The small amount of
debt being exchanged is, basically, not enough of an incentive
for a country to agree to the amount of that risk. In these
situations, the non-governmental organization and the govern-
ment of the debtor country may negotiate to involve the non-
governmental organization in the design and implementation of
the project, thereby alleviating some of the risk.
Currently, successful debt-for-nature swaps have occurred in
seven countries, including Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, the
Philippines, Madagascar, Poland and Zambia. 79 In addition,
Mexico and Brazil have authorized their first swap programs.
The first debt-for-nature swap took place in Bolivia when
Conservation International, a United States based environmental
group, bought $650,000 worth of Bolivia's foreign debt for
$100,000 on the Wall Street secondary debt market during July
of 1987.90 In return, the Bolivian government agreed to establish
three conservation areas totaling 3.7 million acres to serve as
buffer zones to the existing Beni Biosphere reserve in the Boli-
vian Amazon. 8' In addition, the government agreed to provide
See Bruinsma, supra note 4. at 511.
Gibson and Curtis, supra note 67, at 351-52.
" Each country has successfully completed a debt-for-nature project pertaining to





the highest degree of legal protection, as well as establish a
$250,000 fund to administer and manage the reserve .
2
Ecuador also announced a $10 million debt-for-nature pro-
gram in 1987.83 This program varied from Bolivia's in that the
debt authorized was converted by the Central Bank into currency
bonds to be held by Fundacion Natura.Y Bonds were issued
instead of cash for several reasons. First, by issuing bonds with
a nine-year term Ecuador reduced the likelihood of inflationary
impacts on its economy while donors could support long-term
development of a strong local conservation organization."5 Also,
since the bonds have a nine-year term, the planning and imple-
mentation of long-range programs can proceed without fear that
project funding could be cut off.
6
Thus far, the biggest swap occurred in Costa Rica in 1987.
Costa Rica was the third country to announce a debt-for-nature
swap. This swap was a $5 million deal provided by the Bank of
the Netherlands, who bought $24.5 million in debt. The deal
went through after the Central Bank of Costa Rica authorized
up to $5.4 million in debt-for-nature swaps. This authorization
drew contributions from a number of donors, including World
Wildlife Fund, Conservation International, and the Nature Con-
servancy. 7 Proceeds from these bonds finance conservation pro-
grams, such as the expansion of Guanacaste National Park and
the Monteverde Claude Forest Reserve, as well as other programs
and projects. 8
The success of the swaps in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Costa
Rica led to a number of other transactions: the World Wildlife
Fund and the Philippine government agreed in June 1988 to
implement a joint program for a debt-for-nature swap; 9 the
World Wildlife Fund and the Central Bank of Madagascar en-
tered into an agreement in August 1989 involving a total com-
mitment of $3 milion; 90 Zambia and the World Wildlife Fund
82 Id.
,' Id. at 567.
Kathryn S. Fuller & Douglas F. Williamson, Debt-for-Nature Swaps: A New





u Id. The total amount of the debt was purchased at 15 to 17 cents on the dollar.
s Asiedu-Akrofi, supra note 18, at 568.
90 Id. at 569.
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entered into a debt-for-nature swap agreement in August 1989;"
and finally, Mexico agreed to a swap in February 1991.92
Given the success of these transactions, combined with the
growing environmental concerns and increasing foreign debt,
many individuals and environmental groups began to focus on
Brazil as a possible party to a debt-for-nature swap transaction.
The scope for a swap of this type is considerable since Brazil
has developed the world's largest foreign debt (nearly $115 bil-
lion)93 and is home to the world's biggest rain forest.
VII. BRAZIL'S INITIATIVE TOWARD INTERNATIONAL
RECOGNITION
Historically, "Brazilians have maintained an attitude of sov-
ereignty over the Amazon region. Brazilians have been taught
since early childhood that the Amazon ensures their future and
that foreigners, going back to the 17th Century Portuguese and
Spanish gold prospectors, have been trying to steal it away."94
The Amazon has thus become an emotional matter that relates
directly to their sense of national identity. 9 It is this sense that
has fueled the Brazilian agreements over the future of the Am-
azon development for decades.
Officially, Brazil's attitude towards environmentalism prior
to the 1980's was one of resistance to a perceived plot by wealthy
countries to keep the poor from developing. Determined to
proceed on its own course, despite criticism from abroad, the
Brazilian government spent hundreds of millions of dollars under
a development policy for the Amazon region that encouraged
pioneers to resettle the jungle and share in its riches.9
In retaliation to foreign disapproval, the Brazilian govern-
ment pointed to the United States, Japan, France, West Ger-
many and Britain as rich nations that plundered their own forests
and devastated the earth's environment while developing their
respective territories.9 An official of the Interior Ministry said,
, Id. at 570.
9Id.
99 Rene Villeges, Brazil Now Favors Debt-For-Nature Swaps, REuTrs, May 8.
1990.
9' de Lama, supra note 9.
I d.
16 See Asiedu-Akrofi, supra note 18, at 580.
" See de Lama, supra note 9.
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"there is no rich country in the world whose wealth did not
come from its natural resources, or from the resources it took
from other nations. '"98 However, building pressure from abroad
eventually caused Brazil's staunch indifference toward the envi-
ronment to wane.99
The pressure put on Brazil was not only rhetoric but eco-
nomic as well. Both government leaders and international envi-
ronmental organizations took part. The United States took the
lead in the international campaign against the unregulated de-
velopment of the Amazon interior.' °0 The basic intent was to
disrupt foreign lending to Brazil by tile World Bank.
Despite a greater awareness of environmental concerns, the
military government of Brazil, prior to the mid 1980's, was slow
to implement any significant environmental measures concerning
the Amazon region. During the 1970's, the government made
some effort to set aside forest reserves. The most ambitious plan
would set aside 5% of the region for a park or preserve land.
The Brazilian government designated less than 1% for protec-
tion.'0 1 In April 1985, however, Brazil experienced a transition
from military to civilian rule. Tancredo Neves, elected under a
constitutionally prescribed electoral college, died and Vice Pres-
ident Jose Sarney took office before the inauguration. 02
Prospects for a clear Brazilian mandate appeared better un-
der civilian government. However, President Sarney maintained
a tough stance against foreign intrusion and refused to heed
foreign concern over the shrinking Amazon rain forests. 03 Sar-
ney considered the encroachment from abroad as an infringe-
ment on national sovereignty.) 4 This policy appears to have
been maintained despite the proposed inclusion of several Arti-
cles in a new Constitution in 1987 that clearly called for attention
to environmental concerns and the preservation of the Ama-
zon. 05
" Id.
" See generally, Villeges, supra note 93.
1w See generally, US/Brazilian Relations at Low Ebb, INr'L REP. (Feb. 23, 1989).
,' Giaimo, supra note 10, at 555.
Roger W. Findley, Pollution Control in Brazil, 15 EcoLooY L.Q. 1, 42 (1988).
,o de Lama, supra note 9.
'o Powell, supra note 19.
, Giaimo, supra note 10, at 557-58.
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Still apparent in the 1980's was a belief by government
officials that, in spite of development, damage to the rain forests
would be tolerable.'0° Inherent in this belief was the theory that
leadership would tend naturally toward conservation methods as
a result of increasing knowledge about environmental harm. The
former head of Brazil's Land Colonization program more bluntly
stated, "our inefficiency will prevent us from cutting down too
much of the forest."' ' w These beliefs, however, were not suffi-
cient to relieve the international pressure mounting on the Bra-
zilian government.
It was not until 1988 that President Sarney responded to the
international pressure against Brazil. In October, Sarney an-
nounced a plan to restrict government subsidies for agriculture
in the Amazon region.'0 Concessions were relatively minor,
however, causing environmental organizations, especially those
in the United States, to continue the focus on preservation of
the Amazon.' °9 Continuing into 1989, the international ecology
movement maintained pressure by threatening to disrupt dis-
bursements of international credit, particularly World Bank loans
targeted for Amazon development. 1 0
These pressures on Brazil, as well as other Latin American
nations, prompted the Presidents of the States Parties to the
Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation to meet in Manaus, Brazil
in May of 1989 where they signed the Amazon Declaration."'
The countries signing the Declaration included Bolivia, Brazil,
Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, Surinam, and Venezuela.1
2
Their purpose was to reflect a common interest in the Amazon
region and promote a future of cooperation for the development
and protection of the rich heritage of their respective Amazon
territories.'13
Furthermore, in the early 1990's the issue of nuclear power
development underwent a subtle transformation as environmen-
'I Id. at 569.
Id.
' Kevin Fox, Disappearing Amazon: Brazil's Policies, L. A. Tmms, Sept. 10, 1991,
at 2.
See generally, Powell, supra. note 19.
II Id.
The Amazon Declaration, 28 I.L.M. 1303 (1989).
12 Id.
"I Id. While the Declaration reaffirms the sovereign rights of nations with respect
to the natural resources, it also directs that attention be paid to cultural, economic and
ecological concerns of the nation's people and its environment, id.
[VOL. 8:397
DEBT-FOR-NATURE SWAPS
talists shifted their concern from nuclear power to the hydro-
electric power projects planned within the Amazon basin. These
projects posed a severe threat to the rain forests due to the
flooding of large tracts of land. 114 The first half of 1990 would
prove to be a period of transition for Brazil.
Although national policy appeared to be shifting, President-
elect Fernando Collar de Mello denounced foreign intrusion into
Brazilian affairs as did the presidents that served before him.
Immediately prior to his pre-inaugural world trip, he proclaimed
Brazil would not cede one inch from its sovereignty on the
ecology question.' However, international condemnation of
President Collar's position caused him to change his stance by
the end of the trip. 1 6 Nevertheless, by 1990, Brazil was on the
verge of a dramatic turnaround in environmental policy. Presi-
dent Collar's appointment of Joseph Lutzenberger to head the
Environment Secretariat of the forthcoming government was
evidence of this change."
7
The appointment of Lutzenberger was expected to recover
the world prestige lost during Brazil's years of rampant destruc-
tion to the rainforest, thereby winning back opportunity for
foreign loans."' Lutzenberger was popular among the environ-
mentalists. Originally an agronomist, he became a crusader against
chemical pollution in Brazil." 9 Immediately after his appoint-
ment he pledged to preserve the Amazon.'20
Once stating he wanted the Amazon to remain "untoucha-
ble" Lutzenberger later clarified his position and said, "no one
wants to convert the Amazon into a museum but what I propose
is its occupation in a rational, human and ecological manner." '1'
In addition, Lutzenberger voiced his opposition to large dam
projects, as well as the construction of a road through western
Brazil to Peru and additional hydroelectric power plants, such
as the giant Itaipu plant on the border of Paraguay and the
Tucurui plant in the Amazon.
22
" West German Outlook, 1990 INT'L REP. (March 7, 1990), § V, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, International File.
"I Ecology and Investment, supra note 7.
r1 Id.
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President Collar continued through 1990 in his quest to put
Brazil in the vanguard of the environmental movement. 23 During
this year he renewed consideration of debt conversions for in-
vestment in environmental projects. 124 In June 1991, President
Collar took two major steps toward his environmental policy
initiations. First, he dismissed the head of Brazil's Indian pro-
tection agency and unveiled a program to allow foreign financing
of environmental projects in Brazil. 25 Second, he abolished tax
subsidies that had made it profitable to cut down Amazon rain
forests for farming and ranching.'2
With increased scrutiny of environmental issues under the
international microscope, Lutzenberger's tenure drew more and
more controversy. Since the appointment, there had been a
continual confrontational relationship between Lutzenberger and
President Collar. Lutzenberger, as well as the environmental
lobbies, was very vocal about opposition to certain projects and
the commitment of executive agencies. Lutzenberger charged that
ecological programs are often announced with a great deal of
fanfare and later not adequately funded. In addition, Lutzen-
berger criticized the military commander of the Amazon region,
calling him a "fool" in response to charges made by the com-
mander that the Amazon was losing its sovereignty to powerful
international interests and environmentalists.'17 Other issues, such
as the continuation of a road through the Amazon and a pro-
posal to carve military zones out of Indian lands, have brought
threats of resignation from Lutzenberger subject to President
Collar's intention of proceeding with these policies.'2
Lutzenberger's final attack was a charge he made in March
1992, that there was widespread corruption within Brazil's na-
tional environment agency, known as IBAMA.129 Following this
charge President Collar fired Lutzenberger on March 21, 1992
and replaced him with Jose Goldemberg, the former Minister of
Education.
2 Marx, supra note 16.
Id.
' James Brooke, Brazilian Leader Acts to Protect the Amazon, N.Y. TtMas, June
26, 1991, at 9.
I d.
,' Top Environmental Official Fired: Environmentalists Praise Replacement, INT'L





Goldemberg is internationally respected and is seen as pos-
sessing the managerial and administrative experience Lutzenber-
ger lacked. 30 He has experience in organizing international
conferences on the environment and is a proponent of increased
international cooperation to protect the environment. In addi-
tion, Goldemberg knows the history of Brazilian environmental
policy and is critical of past policies of the Brazilian government
that promoted rampant deforestation through road building,
logging, ranching and hydroelectric dam projects.'
Both Lutzenberger and Goldemberg have promoted the use
of debt-for-nature swaps. Their cooperation made it easier for
the proposal of the first debt-for-nature swap announced by
Collar in 1991. The swap consisted of $100 million in foreign
debt that would be exchanged every year for the financing of
environmental projects.
13 2
The limit for the swaps was set at $100 million per year
because of concern the projects would force a rise in inflation.
Inflation became a huge concern for the Brazilian government.
For the five months prior to 1990, inflation was 8207o. In 1990,
inflation approached 1,800% and was approximately 1,400% in
1991.111 Thus, when Brazil decided to propose money for the
swap it was forced to balance the estimated effects a large swap
would have on the future economy through increased inflation
with the potential international good will that would result from
the implementation of such an initiative.
VIII. BRAZI'S LOOKS TOWARD =i FUTURE
Debt-for-nature swaps have been an integral part of Presi-
dent Collar's environmental initiative. On June 26, 1991, the
President submitted a plan to a Group of Seven (G-7) leaders
in London drawn up by the Brazilian government, the World
Bank and the European Community.1'4 The Plan was entitled
130 Id.
13 Id.
"I Brooke, supra note 125. Prior to this time, although debt-for-nature swaps were
already in use, they were not initiated because of the opposition of Brazil's Economy
Minister, Zelia Cardoso de Mello, id. The new Economy Minister, Marilio Marques
Moriera, supported debt-for-nature swaps allowing the initiation of the first financial
proposition. Brazil to Create $100 Million Fund for Environment, PROPRIETARY TO THE
UPI, June 25, 1991, (BC cycle) available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
I d.
" Micheal Stott, Brazil Hopes G-7 Will Approve Plan to Save Amazon Forest,
REUTERS, Jul. 16, 1991, (BC cycle).
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the "Pilot Program for the Protection of the Tropical Forests
of Brazil" and called for $1.57 billion to save the Amazon
rainforest from burning and logging and to promote "green"
development.35 The Plan requested that the G-71 6 finance the
entire $1.57 billion with cheap loans and donations. Although
not a principal source, debt-for-nature swaps were also listed as
a possible source of finance. The dollars raised would then be
utilized for measures ranging from environmental awareness
campaigns to the purchase of large tracts of land to create
national parks and preserves. The Plan's central theme is envi-
ronmentally-sound development that allows the inhabitants a
decent and sound life, without devastation of the rain forest's
interior. 1
3 7
The proposal of this plan, as well as the announcement that
$100 million a year will be designated for a debt-for-nature swap
program, was part of a series of initiatives by the Brazilian
government to prepare for the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development, held in July 1992 in Rio de
Janeiro. Heads of state from over 100 nations attended the
international meeting in an effort to sign a common agenda for
the protection of the environment into the 21st century.
On May 12, 1992, only months prior to the "Earth Summit,"
Brazil approved its first debt-for-nature swap.'38 The financial
transaction entailed the purchase of $2.2 million of Brazilian
debt in the secondary market, financed by the Nature Conser-
vancy, who raised $850,000 in private donations for the pur-
chase. 3 9 The debt will then be donated to FUNATURA, who
will exchange it for $2.2 million in dollar-adjusted, long-term
Brazilian "Environmental Government Bonds" paying 6% in-
terest per year.'40 The bonds will be used to create an endowment
fund for the Grand Sertao Veredas National Park located in the
"cerrado" region of northern Minas Gerais.' 41 The interest, es-
Id. at July 16, 1991 (AM cycle).
116 The G7 consisted of the United States, Japan, Germany, France, Britain, Italy,
and Canada.
137 Id.
"I3 Brazil Approves First Debt-For-Nature Swap, PR News, May 12, 1992, available






timated at $132,000 will be used to fund conservation, manage-
ment, and educational projects at the park. 42
The Brazilian government benefits from the swap through
its ability to retire $2.2 million in hard-currency debt held outside
the country in exchange for domestically held local-currency debt
spaced out over more years. However, the government also
greatly benefits from the international exposure of the swap.
The approval of the swap occurred just prior to the Earth
Summit, where Brazil and other debtor nations sought financial
assistance from leading economic nations to tackle these tough
and expensive environmental problems. The approval appears to
have been an attempt to show the world that Brazil's government
is willing to participate in the global environmental initiative.
Despite these initiatives, however, the actual destruction of
the Brazilian rain forest is not projected to slow and may even
increase. 143 The causes of the destruction still remain. The impact
of the one debt-for-nature swap on the environment will be
small compared to the huge effects of the continued burning,
clearing and logging of the Amazon.'"M The actual accomplish-
ment in this case, therefore, appears to be only a moral one.
The real benefit is derived from a shift in philosophy by those
in control over the future of the Amazon. Whether this shift is
merely a small offering to appease world concern or the first
step in a genuine initiative toward ecological concern will only
be answered by future policies and initiatives of the Brazilian
government.
IX. THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
The potential international effects of the devastating impacts
of deforestation leads to possible applicability of international
declarations and treaties that may be used to protect the Ama-
zon. One such declaration is Principle 21 of the United Nations
Declaration on the Human Environment, written in Stockholm
in 1972. Generally, the declaration is an international legal man-
date that provides assurances from the signing states that their
jurisdiction will not cause damage to the environment. This
I d.
Tova Chapoval, Brazilian Amazon Burnings Likely to Rise This Year, REUTERs,
Aug. 13, 1992.
" One of the main points of discussion at the U.N. sponsored summit was the
continued burning and cutting of the rain forests, id.
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declaration is criticized as being of little value with respect to
the issue at hand, however, since it is not legally binding and it
recognizes that lesser developed countries may favor develop-
ment over the environment.1
4
S
Another alternative may be the Treaty for Amazonian
Cooperation. 1" This treaty was signed by the eight countries
whose territories include portions of the Amazon Basin. How-
ever, this treaty is also criticized because it does not address the
exploitation of the Amazon, as far as initiating substantive con-
straints, rather only with respect to the outside intervention of
other countries. 147
A third alternative may be the United Nations World Charter
for Nature signed in 1982.1" This charter does address the ad-
verse impacts on nature permitted by nations. However, this
alternative, although comprehensive in scope and compulsory in
its language, has no binding force. In addition, the Amazonian
nations, including Brazil, have expressed their opposition to this
charter.'49
Thus, it is apparent that international environmental law has
not discovered the answer the ecologists and governments are
looking for to address the Amazon rain forest problem. Perhaps
this is why governments and non-governmental agencies have
tended to take alternative means, such as debt-for-nature swaps,
to address environmental concerns. However, effective legal rem-
edies must be found so that debt-for-nature swaps can continue
in an efficient manner without abuse.
Without an effective legal duty to continue the swap agree-
ment, the principal motivation for the developing countries'
adherence to the agreement stems from their fear of political
and economic reprisal by creditor nations. On the other hand,
this fear is an insufficient deterrent in the face of developing
nations' tremendous domestic economic and political pressures.
Often a country may not be willing to accept strict enforcement
provisions. For example, Bolivia was reluctant to accept stricter
terms based in part on the risk of not being able to live up to
the agreement due to circumstances beyond its control. Because
141 Giaimo, supra note 10, at 559.
M" Id. at 559-60.
" Id.
141 Id. at 560-61.
"I Id. at 561.
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the small amount of debt being exchanged would not have been
enough of an incentive for Bolivia to agree to stricter terms,
Conservation International consented to maintain an extensive
involvement throughout the design and implementation of the
project.
Thus, in order to eliminate the economic and political risk
factors, some form of multilateral or regional treaty is required
that would establish codes of behavior and create dispute settle-
ment procedures requiring negotiation between parties. Without
this security arrangement in the environmental investment, debt-
for-nature swaps, may not prove to be as beneficial in the long
run. However, with regional and/or international agreements,
the strength of a debtor nation's sovereignty may improve due
to the improved fiscal health of the nation.
CONCLUSION
Although it appears that Brazil's destruction of its Amazon
rain forest has slowed only slightly over the past two decades,
the nation has become increasingly aware, if not of the grave
environmental consequences of the destruction, at least of the
seriousness of international concern over the matter. Brazil's
reluctant obeyance of international environmental initiatives by
only recently approving its first debt-for-nature swap is perhaps
a signal to the rest of the world that it wants to, and indeed
needs to, participate in the world economy. The actual environ-
mental effects of the swap will likely be minimal. Its apparent
indication to those seeking environmental initiatives from the
nation of Brazil is that another lumbering step forward has been
taken in the long way towards global environmental security.
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